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Abstract
We propose a framework of bit commitment protocol using a comparison
scheme and present a compound comparison scheme based on counterfactual
cryptography. Finally, we propose a counterfactual quantum bit commitment
protocol. In security analysis, we give the proper security parameters for
counterfactual quantum bit commitment and prove that intercept attack and
intercept/resend attack are ineffective attack for our protocol. In addition,
we explain that counterfactual quantum bit commitment protocol cannot be
attacked with no-go theorem attack by current technology.
Keywords: counterfactual quantum cryptography, unconditional security,
quantum bit commitment
1. Introduction
The bit commitment (BC) scheme is a two-party protocol which plays a
crucial role in constructions of multi-party protocols. BC scheme includes two
phases. In the commit phase, Alice commits to b ( b = 0 or b = 1 ) and sends
a piece of evidence to Bob. In the opening phase, Alice unveils the value of b
and Bob checks it with the evidence. A BC scheme has the following security
properties. (i) Concealing. Bob cannot know the commitment bit b before
the opening phase. (ii) Binding. Alice cannot change the commitment bit
after the commit phase. A BC scheme is unconditionally secure if and only
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if there is no computational assumption on attacker’s ability and it satisfies
the properties of concealing and binding.
The concept of BC was first proposed by Blum in [1]. With the develop-
ment of quantum cryptography, the first quantum bit commitment (QBC)
scheme was proposed in 1984 [2] but unfortunately the binding security of
the scheme can be attacked by entangled states. Then a well-known QBC
scheme was presented [3], which is usually referred to as BCJL scheme and
was once believed as a provably secure scheme. However, Mayers found that
the BCJL scheme was insecure [4]. Later, Mayers, Lo and Chau separately
present no-go theorem and prove that the unconditional secure QBC protocol
is impossible [5–7].
However, the framework of the theorem may not cover all the types of
QBC protocols. Some QBC protocols against no-go theorem type attack
have been proposed. Using special relativity, the relativistic QBC protocols
are proposed by Kent [8–10]. Using the physical hypothesis, the bounded-
quantum-storage model [11, 12], and noisy-storage model [13–15] are pre-
sented.
In this paper, we first construct a universal framework for BC protocol. A
comparison protocol is invoked in the framework. Then we propose the com-
parison protocol based on counterfactual quantum cryptography(N09)[16].
Finally, a counterfactual quantum bit commitment protocol (CQBC) is pre-
sented. In this CQBC protocol, Bob sends the states and Alice only receives
some of the states. In the ideal protocol, Bob sends a single photon and he
obviously knows whether Alice receives the photon. Alice’s traditional attack
based on no-go theorem needs to send or return the states to Bob. In this
protocol, once she gets the states sent by Bob, Bob knows her choice and she
cannot change the bit anymore. In addition, Alice’s operation is to control
the macroscopic device SW . It cannot be realized by quantum states, which
is an important reason why Alice cannot perform no-go theorem type attack.
2. Preliminary
Noh proposed a special QKD protocol (N09)[16], in which the particle
carrying secret information is not transmitted through the quantum channel.
Fig. 1 shows the architecture of the QKD protocol. In the QKD protocol,
Alice randomly encodes horizontal-polarized state |H〉 as the bit value ”0”
or vertical-polarized state |V 〉 as the bit value ”1” and sends the state by
the single photon source S. When Bob’s bit value is the same as Alice’s, the
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optical switch SW controlled in the correct time. In this case, the interference
is destroyed and there are three occasions for the single photon. Suppose the
reflectivity and transmissivity of the BS are R and T , where R + T = 1.
The probabilities of detectors are as follows. (i) Detector D0 clicks with the
probability of R2. The photon travels via path a and then is reflected by the
BS again. (ii) Detector D1 clicks with the probability of RT . The photon
travels via path a and then pass through the BS. (iii) Detector D2 clicks with
the probability of T . The photon travels via path b and is controlled by the
SW to reach the detector D2. When Bob’s bit value is different from Alice’s,
the setup is a Michelson-type interferometer and the detector D0 clicks. Alice
and Bob only remain the bit in the event that the detector D1 clicks alone to
be the shared keys. The other events are used for eavesdropping detection.
The security of N09 protocol has been proved. In [17], Yin et al. proposed
an entanglement distillation protocol equivalent to the N09 protocol. Then
give a strict security proof assuming that the perfect single photon source is
applied and Trojan-horse attack can be detected. In 2012, Zhang et al. give
a more intuitive security proof against the general intercept-resend attacks
[18].
Figure 1: The architecture of the N09 QKD protocol. The setup is a modification based on
Michelson-type interferometer. The single photon source S emits a optical pulse containing
only one photon. Then the pulse is transmitted through the optical circulator C and split
into two pulses by the beam splitter BS. The two light paths a and b are the arms of
the Michelson-type interferometer, and the length of the path a is adjusted by an optical
delay OD. The pulse transmitted through path a is reflected by the Faraday mirror FM0
and back to BS. The pulse transmitted through path b travels to Bob’s site.
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3. A Framework of Bit Commitment Protocol
BC is a two-party cryptographic protocol. In the commit phase, one
party Alice commits to the other party Bob to a bit b by sending a piece
of evidence. In the opening phase, Alice announces the value of b and Bob
verifies whether it is indeed the commitment bit. We give a framework to
construct BC protocol. The BC scheme which satisfies this framework could
be secure by selecting appropriate security parameters.
Protocol 1. The framework of bit commitment protocol
Commit Phase:
1. Alice and Bob agree on two security parameters m and n.
2. Alice chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} as her commitment bit. Then she
generates m random bit strings according to the value of b. Each se-
quence consists n bits, which can be represented as a(i) ≡ (a(i)1 a(i)2 ...a(i)n ) ∈
{0, 1}n, i = 1, 2, ...,m. Each sequence satisfies a(i)1 ⊕ a(i)2 ⊕ ...⊕ a(i)n = b.
3. Bob generates m bit strings randomly and uniformly with the length of
n. Each sequence is represented as b(i) ≡ (b(i)1 b(i)2 ...b(i)n ) ∈ {0, 1}n.
4. Alice and Bob invoke another particular protocol to give some evidence
of commitment to Bob. In this step, Bob compares b
(i)
j with a
(i)
j bit-
by-bit and knows b
(i)
j = a
(i)
j , b
(i)
j 6= a(i)j , or nothing. For each bit-
comparison, Bob could confirm the value of Alice’s bit with a probability
p and Alice knows that Bob confirms her bit with a probability q, where
0 ≤ q < p < 1.
Opening Phase:
1. Alice reveals the bit b, the m sequences (a
(i)
1 a
(i)
2 ...a
(i)
n ), i = 1, 2, ...,m to
Bob.
2. Bob verifies whether a
(i)
1 ⊕ a(i)2 ⊕ ... ⊕ a(i)n = b, and whether Alice’s
opening results consistent with the bits he knows. If the consistency
holds, he admits Alice’s commitment value as b.
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4. Counterfactual Quantum Bit Commitment
There is a particular protocol invoked in Step 4 of Protocol 1. In this
section, we first construct the two-party protocol based on counterfactual
cryptography. The aim of the two-party protocol is to realize the comparison
bit by bit with a fix probability. Then invoke the comparison protocol to give
the CQBC protocol.
Figure 2: The architecture of Protocol 2 and Protocol 3. The difference between this
architecture with that of Fig.1 is that Bob is the sender in this architecture.
Protocol 2. Comparison based on counterfactual cryptography
1. Alice and Bob set up devices according to Fig. 2, where the beam splitter
BS is a half transparent and half reflecting mirror.
2. Alice and Bob perform a test to determine the time parameters. Bob
sends a series of states |H〉 or |V 〉 to Alice and tells her what the
states are before sending. Then Alice tries to control the optical switch
SW in proper time to make detector D0, D1, D2 click, respectively.
Through this test, three time parameters could be determined. That
are, ∆t0: the time that the states spend from the source S through the
polarizing beam splitter PBS to the optical switch SW ; ∆t1: the time
that the states spend from the source S through the optical loop OL to
the optical switch SW ; ∆t2: the time that the states spend from the
source S, reflected by FM1 to Bob’s site again.
3. Alice and Bob decide on a series of time instants t
(i)
1 , t
(i)
2 , ..., t
(i)
n , where
i = 1, 2, ...m. Bob generates his comparison bits string (b
(i)
1 b
(i)
2 ...b
(i)
n ) ∈
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{0, 1}n and sends the corresponding states |Ψ
b
(i)
j
〉 at the time t(i)j , where
|Ψ0〉 = |H〉 and |Ψ1〉 = |V 〉.
4. Alice generates her comparison bits string (a
(i)
1 a
(i)
2 ...a
(i)
n ) ∈ {0, 1}n and
controls the optical switch SW in the corresponding time. When a
(i)
j =
0, she controls SW at the time t
(i)
j + ∆t0; When a
(i)
j = 1, she controls
SW at the time t
(i)
j + ∆t1.
5. Alice and Bob record the response of the detector D2, D0, D1 as (α
(i)
1 α
(i)
2
...α
(i)
n ) ∈ {0, 1}n, (β(i)01 β(i)02 ...β(i)0n) ∈ {0, 1}n, (β(i)11 β(i)12 ...β(i)1n) ∈ {0, 1}n,
respectively. α
(i)
j , β
(i)
0j , β
(i)
1j = 0 denotes that there is no click in the
related detector. α
(i)
j , β
(i)
0j , β
(i)
1j = 1 denotes the related detector clicks.
Note that as long as the detectors do not click in the correct time, they
record the result “0”. For example, if Bob’s detectors D0 and D1 have
not clicked until t
(i)
j + ∆t2, he records β
(i)
0j = β
(i)
1j = 0.
Protocol 3. Counterfactual bit commitment
Commit Phase:
1. Alice and Bob set up devices according to Fig. 2, where the beam splitter
BS is a half transparent and half reflecting mirror. They share two
security parameters m and n.
2. Alice chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} as her commitment bit. Then she
generates m random bit strings according to the value of b. Each se-
quence consists n bits, which can be represented as a(i) ≡ (a(i)1 a(i)2 ...a(i)n ) ∈
{0, 1}n, i = 1, 2, ...,m. Each sequence satisfies a(i)1 ⊕ a(i)2 ⊕ ...⊕ a(i)n = b.
3. Bob generates m bit strings randomly and uniformly with the length of
n. Each sequence is represented as b(i) ≡ (b(i)1 b(i)2 ...b(i)n ) ∈ {0, 1}n.
4. Alice and Bob decide on a series of time instants t
(i)
1 , t
(i)
2 , ..., t
(i)
n and
4t, where 4t is the time a photon transfers from the beam splitter
BS to the optical switch SW through the polarizing beam splitter PBS
without the optical loop OL. Bob sends |Ψ
b
(i)
j
〉 at the time t(i)j while
Alice controls the switch with bit a
(i)
j . |Ψ0〉 = |H〉 and |Ψ1〉 = |V 〉
represent the horizontal-polarized state and the vertical-polarized state,
respectively.
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5. Alice and Bob record the time and response of their detectors. For each
sequence of states, Alice verifies whether the detection of D2 is around
n/4. If the proportion is incongruent, abort the protocol.
Opening Phase:
1. Alice reveals the bit b, the m sequences (a
(i)
1 a
(i)
2 ...a
(i)
n ), i = 1, 2, ...,m
and the response of her three detectors to Bob.
2. Bob verifies whether a
(i)
1 ⊕ a(i)2 ⊕ ... ⊕ a(i)n = b, and the response of all
the detectors agree with the state |Ψ
b
(i)
j
〉. If the consistency holds, he
admits Alice’s commitment value as b.
5. Security Analysis
5.1. Security of BC Model
We present a framework to construct BC protocol in Protocol 1. For
each bit-comparison, Bob confirms the value of Alice’s bit with a probability
p and Alice knows that Bob confirms her bit with a probability q, where
0 ≤ q < p < 1. p > 0 means that Bob has a piece of evidence. Since
p < 1, Bob cannot know all of Alice’s bits correctly. By choosing appropriate
security parameters n, the protocol can satisfy the concealing security. If
Alice tries to alter one bit in the opening phase, her best choice is to change
the bit she cannot distinguish whether Bob knows with a probability of 1−q.
In fact, there are around (1 − p)n qubits Bob cannot judge. If p = q, Alice
can accurately alters the bit in part that Bob really does not know without
detection. If q < p, the range of bits that can be altered by Alice is larger
than that Bob cannot distinguish, and her attack may be caught. Therefore,
the conditions 0 ≤ q < p < 1 is the necessary condition of the binding
security.
5.1.1. Binding of BC Model
If Alice tries to attack the binding of the protocol, she has to alter odd bits
for each sequence in the opening phase. In each sequence, she can distinguish
that around qn bits are confirmed by Bob. Alice’s optimal strategy is to alter
one bit in the range of the other (1− q)n bits. Among the (1− q)n bits, only
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(1 − p)n bits are not known by Bob. Therefore, the probability that Alice
alters one bit without detection is
p(Aalter) =
(1− p)n
(1− q)n =
1− p
1− q . (1)
Then in m sequences, the probability of changing the commitment bit with-
out detection is p(Aatler)m. Since p(Aalter) < 1, p(Aatler)m can be expo-
nentially small and the protocol can satisfy the binding security by choosing
appropriate security parameter m.
5.1.2. Concealing of BC Model
For each bit, Bob confirms the value with a probability p. In some par-
ticular conditions, Bob may have a larger probability p′ to guess the value
correctly, which can be seen in Section 5.2. For a sequence of qubits, Bob
makes sure the commitment value with a probability of p′n. Given m qubit
strings, the probability that Bob has no idea about the commitment value is
(1− p′n)m. Define ε as the probability that Bob ascertains the commitment
value,
ε ≡ 1− (1− p′n)m . (2)
If Bob does not confirm the commitment value from the protocol, he just
guess with a probability of 1/2. Therefore, the probability that Bob obtains
the right commitment value is
p(Bknows) = ε+
1− ε
2
=
1
2
+
ε
2
. (3)
Then the advantage of Bob breaking the concealing security is∣∣∣∣p(Bknows)− 12
∣∣∣∣ = ε2 = 12 − (1− p′n)m2 . (4)
Since 0 < p′ < 1, then∣∣∣∣p(Bknows)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ' 12 − 1−mp′n2 = mp′n. (5)∣∣p(Bknows)− 1
2
∣∣ can be exponentially small and the protocol can satisfy the
concealing security by choosing appropriate security parameters m and n.
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5.2. Analysis of Comparison Protocol
Bob sends single-photon states |H〉 and |V 〉 representing the bit value
“0” and “1”. The initial states after the beam splitter BS become
|φ0〉 =
√
t|0〉a|H〉b + i
√
r|H〉a|0〉b,
|φ1〉 =
√
t|0〉a|V 〉b + i
√
r|V 〉a|0〉b,
(6)
where a and b represent the path towards Bob’s Faraday mirror FM0 and
the path towards Bob’s site, respectively. t and r are the transmissivity and
the reflectivity of the BS. Both |φ0〉 and |φ0〉 can be denoted as Fock state
|φ〉 = √t|0〉a|1〉b + i
√
r|1〉a|0〉b.
When a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j , the state |φ〉 collapses to one of the two states, |0〉a|1〉b
or |1〉a|0〉b due to Alice’s measurement with probability t and r, respec-
tively. The state |1〉a|0〉b goes past the BS again and becomes
√
t|0〉0|1〉1 +
i
√
r|1〉0|0〉1, where the subscript 0 and 1 represent the path containing D0
and D1, respectively. Therefore, the total probability that D0 detects the
photon is r2 and the probability that D1 detects the photon is rt.
When a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j , one of the path introduces pi phase and the initial state
becomes
√
t|0〉a|1〉b − i
√
r|1〉a|0〉b. Then the state passes the BS again and
becomes
√
t|0〉a|1〉b − i
√
r|1〉a|0〉b
BS−−→√t(√t|1〉0|0〉1 + i
√
r|0〉0|1〉1)− i
√
r(
√
t|0〉0|1〉1 + i
√
r|1〉0|0〉1)
===t|1〉0|0〉1 + i
√
rt|0〉0|1〉1 − i
√
rt|0〉0|1〉1 + r|1〉0|0〉1
===|1〉0|0〉1.
(7)
It can be seen that when a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j , the photon is detected by D0 with a
probability 100%.
Table 1: The detection probability of each detector. r and t are the reflectivity and
transmissivity of the beam splitter BS.
a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j a(i)j = b(i)j
β
(i)
0j = 1 1 r
2
β
(i)
1j = 1 0 rt
α
(i)
j = 1 0 t
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The detection probability of each detector are listed in Table 1. When the
detector D1 or D2 clicks (detector D0 does not click), Bob confirms Alice’s
bit is the same as his. It can be seen that
p = p(a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j , β
(i)
1j = 1) + p(a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j , α
(i)
j = 1) =
1
2
(rt+ t). (8)
When D0 clicks, it can be seen that p(a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j ) > p(a(i)j = b(i)j ). Although
Bob cannot confirm the value of a
(i)
j , he can guess a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j with a correct
probability of p(a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j |β(i)0j = 1), where
p(a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j |β(i)0j = 1) =
1
1 + r2
. (9)
Then the probability that Bob guesses Alice’s bit a
(i)
j correctly is
p′ = p+ p(a(i)j 6= b(i)j , β(i)0j = 1) = 7/8. (10)
When the detector D2 clicks, Alice confirms Bob has obtained her bit. There-
fore,
q =
1
2
t = 1/4. (11)
5.3. Security of Counterfactual Quantum Bit Commitment
We have proved the security of the BC framework for fixed parameters
p, p′ and q. Then for the comparison protocol based on counterfactual cryp-
tography, we analyze the related parameters. In this section, we will analyze
the possible attacks for the complex protocol. The schematic of Protocol 2
and Protocol 3 is simple that there exist only a few attacks. For Bob, he
may attack by change the beam splitter with different parameters or send
illegal states. For Alice, she has two kinds of attacks, i.e. intercept attack
and intercept/resend attack. In addition, we discuss the reason why Alice
can hardly apply the attack using no-go theorem.
5.3.1. Bob’s Cheating
The emission device is in Bob’s site. The general attacks are to send
illegal states and change the device.
If Bob sends illegal single-photon states with different polarizations, such
as |+〉 or |−〉, it just influences the photons transmitted or reflected by PBS.
And it can never increase the probability p, which is an ineffective attack.
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Bob may attack by sending illegal multi-photon states. When multiple
photons are transferred in the scheme, the number of photons detected by
D2 is larger than n/4. In Step 5 of Protocol 3, Alice verifies the detection of
D2 and this attack can be found by the check.
Bob may not using a standard half transparent and half reflecting mirror
in the protocol. Assume the transmissivity of the illegal BS is t′, then clicks
of D2 is around t
′/2. Different BS leads different clicks of D2. This attack
can also be detected by the check in Step 5 of Protocol 3.
5.3.2. Alice’s Cheating
Intercept attack. When Alice performs intercept attack, the probabil-
ity q would be increased and she may have a larger probability of altering
the commitment without detection. Then we will analyze whether it is an
effective attack. Alice can control the optical switch SW both at the time
t
(i)
j + ∆t0 and t
(i)
j + ∆t1 to increase the probability q. However, if she in-
tercepts all of the photons transmitted through the beam splitter BS, the
number of photons detected by D2 is around n/2 in a n-bit sequence. The
obliviously wrong ratio can be detected by Bob. Therefore, Alice should only
select a few of photons to intercept.
Assume Alice selects n0 photons to intercept. She intercepts the photons
both in the cases a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j and a(i)j = b(i)j . When a(i)j 6= b(i)j , the number of
photons detected by D2 is n0; the number of photons detected by D0 is n−n0.
When a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j , the number of photons detected by D2 is n0+(tn−n0) = tn;
the number of photons detected by D1 is rtn; the number of photons detected
by D0 is r
2n. Therefore, the total clicks for detectors D0, D1 and D2 are
N(β
(i)
0j = 1) =
1
2
(n− n0) + 1
2
r2n =
5
8
n− 1
2
n0;
N(β
(i)
1j = 1) =
1
2
rtn =
1
8
n;
N(α
(i)
j = 1) =
1
2
n0 +
1
2
tn =
1
4
n+
1
2
n0.
(12)
The total clicks are N(β
(i)
0j = 1) + N(β
(i)
1j = 1) + N(α
(i)
j = 1) = n. When
α
(i)
j = 1, Alice knows that Bob confirms her bit. Her optimal strategy is to
alter one bit in the range of n−N(α(i)j = 1) bits. Among n−N(α(i)j = 1) bits,
only N(β
(i)
0j = 1) bits are not confirmed by Bob. Therefore, the probability
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that Alice alters one bit without detection by this attack is
p′(Aalter) =
N(β
(i)
0j = 1)
n−N(α(i)j = 1)
=
5n− 4n0
6n− 4n0 . (13)
When Alice does not intercept, the probability of altering one bit without
detection is p(Aalter) = 5/6. It can be seen that p′(Aalter) < p(Aalter).
The intercept attack makes Alice detected by Bob with larger probability
and it is not an effective attack.
Intercept/resend attack. When Alice performs intercept attack, the
numerator and denominator of p(Aalter) are both increased. Then it makes
Alice detected by Bob with larger probability and it is not an effective attack.
We will analyze another similar attack, i.e. intercept/resend attack. Alice
controls the optical switch SW both at the time t
(i)
j + ∆t0 and t
(i)
j + ∆t1.
When she detects each photon, she immediately sends another photon with
the same polarization back to Bob’s site. If Alice intercepts and resends all
of the photons transmitted through the beam splitter BS, the numbers of
the photons detected by D0 and D1 are the same, which is different from the
original ratio and detected by Bob. Therefore, Alice should select only a few
photons and resend them back.
Assume Alice selects n′0 photons to intercept and resend. She intercepts
and resends the photons both in the cases a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j and a(i)j = b(i)j . When
a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j , the number of photons detected by D2 is n′0; the number of photons
detected by D1 is rn
′
0; the number of photons detected by D0 is n−n′0 + tn′0.
When a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j , the number of photons detected by D2 is tn; the number of
photons detected by D1 is rtn+ rn
′
0; the number of photons detected by D0
is r2n+ tn′0. Therefore, the total clicks for detectors D0, D1 and D2 are
N ′(β(i)0j = 1) =
1
2
(n− n′0 + tn′0) +
1
2
(r2n+ tn′0) =
5
8
n;
N ′(β(i)1j = 1) =
1
2
rn′0 +
1
2
(rtn+ rn′0) =
1
8
n+
1
2
n′0;
N ′(α(i)j = 1) =
1
2
n′0 +
1
2
tn =
1
4
n+
1
2
n′0.
(14)
Since Alice resends n′0 photons, the total clicks are N
′(β(i)0j = 1) + N
′(β(i)1j =
1) + N ′(α(i)j = 1) = n + n
′
0. Among N
′(α(i)j = 1) bits, there are n
′
0 bits
intercepted and resent by Alice. The indexes of intercepted bits are the same
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as that of resent bits. For these n′0 bits, although Alice knows the related
value of b
(i)
j , she has no idea whether the resent bit is detected by D0 or D1.
Therefore, Alice do not know whether Bob confirms these n′0 bits. When
she changes her commitment, the altering range is n − [N ′(α(i)j = 1) − n′0].
Only N ′(β(i)0j = 1) bits are not confirmed by Bob and Alice changes these
bits would not be detected. Therefore, the probability that Alice alters one
bit without detection by this attack is
p′′(Aalter) =
N ′(β(i)0j = 1)
n− [N ′(α(i)j = 1)− n′0]
=
5n
6n+ 4n0
. (15)
It can be seen that p′′(Aalter) < p(Aalter). The intercept/resend attack
makes Alice detected by Bob with larger probability and it is not an effective
attack either.
No-go theorem attack.The frame of no-go theorem is described as
follows. When Alice commits b, she prepares
|b〉 =
∑
i
α
(b)
i
∣∣e(b)i 〉A ⊗ ∣∣φ(b)i 〉B, (16)
where
〈
e
(b)
i
∣∣e(b)j 〉A = δij while ∣∣φ(b)i 〉B’s are not necessarily orthogonal to each
other. She sends the second register to Bob as a piece of evidence. To
ensure the concealing of the QBC protocol, the density matrices describing
the second register are approximative. i.e.,
TrA|0〉〈0| ≡ ρB0 ' ρB1 ≡ TrA|1〉〈1|. (17)
When Eq. (17) is satisfied, Alice can apply a local unitary transformation to
rotate |0〉 to |1〉 without detection.
In Protocol 3, the quantum states are prepared by Bob and Alice has no
original states. If Alice wants to attack using no-go theorem, she tries to per-
form a controlled unitary transformation instead of the protocol operation,
which is inspired by [19]. The control bit in the transformation is entangled
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with the other register. That is, when Alice commits “0”, the whole state is
|0〉 = 1
2n−1
∑
a
(i)
1 ⊕...⊕a(i)n =0
|a(i)1 ...a(i)n 〉AUB(a(i)1 ...a(i)n )
n⊗
j=1
|Ψ
b
(i)
j
〉B
=
1
2n−1
∑
a
(i)
1 ⊕...⊕a(i)n =0
|a(i)1 ...a(i)n 〉A[UB(a(i)1 )|Ψb(i)1 〉B]⊗ ...⊗ [UB(a
(i)
n )|Ψb(i)n 〉B]
=
1
2n−1
∑
a
(i)
1 ⊕...⊕a(i)n =0
|a(i)1 ...a(i)n 〉A|Ψ′b(i)1 〉B ⊗ ...⊗ |Ψ
′
b
(i)
n
〉B.
(18)
Similarly, when Alice commits “1”, the whole state is
|1〉 = 1
2n−1
∑
a
(i)
1 ⊕...⊕a(i)n =1
|a(i)1 ...a(i)n 〉A|Ψ′b(i)1 〉B ⊗ ...⊗ |Ψ
′
b
(i)
n
〉B. (19)
Since the concealing of Protocol 3 can be satisfied, Alice can perform a local
unitary transformation to rotate |0〉 to |1〉. However, two characters limit
this attack can hardly work with current technology.
1. In Protocol 3, the operation of Alice is to control the optical switch
SW at different time according to a
(i)
j . The SW is a macrocosmic
device. If Alice does not replace the macrocosmic optical switch, her
attack operation is equivalent to exponential Schrodinger’s cat, which
is to use superposed quantum states to control the macrocosmic devices
coherently. Since Schrodinger’s cat has not been implemented yet, this
kind of attack cannot be realized now.
2. Through the above reason, the only way of performing no-go theorem
attack is to replace the macrocosmic optical switch with microcosmic
device. However, how to use microcosmic device to realize the function
of SW is unsolved and it is a question for the future research.
5.4. Security Parameters
In Section 5.3, we have analyze that Alice’s intercept attack and inter-
cept/resend attack cannot work. The probability that Alice alters one bit
without detection is
P (Aalter) =
1− p
1− q = 5/6. (20)
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Then in the QBC scheme, the probability of changing the commitment bit
without detection is P (Aatler)m. When m = 70, the probability that Alice
breaks the binding security is approximate to 2.8× 10−6.
In Step 5 of Protocol 3, Alice verifies the detection of D2 and this check
makes Bob cannot send illegal states or use illegal devices. The probability
that Bob guesses Alice’s bit a
(i)
j correctly is limited to p
′ = 7/8. And the
advantage of Bob breaking the concealing security is∣∣∣∣P (Bknows)− 12
∣∣∣∣ = 12 − (1− P nB)m2 (21)
When m = 70, n = 130, the probability that Bob breaks the concealing
security is approximate to 1.0× 10−6.
To limit cheating probability around 10−6, m = 70, n = 130, is one
pair of proper parameters. The values of security parameters can be set up
according to different security requirement.
6. Discussion
There are two critical parameters p and q in Protocol 1, where p is the
probability that Bob confirm the value of Alice’s bit and q is the probability
that Alice knows Bob confirms. Does that means the protocol is superlu-
minal? Absolutely not! It can be seen in Protocol 2 and Protocol 3 the
single photon is transferred to Alice’s site and then the photon or no photon
returns to Bob’s site. Bob obtains the information according to the response
of his detectors. There is an interactive process in the protocol. Actually,
the interactive process, including quantum states interaction and classical
information interaction, is necessary for the BC framework.
7. Conclusion
We first construct a universal framework for BC protocol using com-
parison scheme. Then we propose the comparison protocol based on coun-
terfactual quantum cryptography. Finally, a CQBC protocol is presented.
Then we analyze the security of three protocols and give the proper secu-
rity parameters for CQBC protocol. For concealing security, we prove that
cheating Bob sending illegal states and using illegal devices can be detected
by Alice. For binding security, we prove that Alice’s intercept attack and
intercept/resend attack are both ineffective attack. No-go theorem attack
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can hardly be performed with current technology for two reasons: (i) If Alice
uses the macroscopical optical switch, her attack operation is equivalent to
using superposed quantum states to control the macroscopical devices, which
cannot be realized now; (ii) The way of using microcosmic device to realize
the function of SW is an unsolved question to be researched in the future.
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